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Aharon Barak* 
A. ON SOCIETY 
Law is everywhere - though law is not everything. Law is everywhere in the 
sense that all human conduct is the subject of a legal norm. Even when an activity -
such as friendship - is controlled by the autonomy of individual will, that autonomy 
exists within the law. Without it, everyone would have the freedom to invade that area. 
However, law is not everything. There is religion, and morals. The law is a means to 
organize life between the members of a given society at a given time. The law is a tool 
that allows society to function. Each society's members must determine the appropriate 
character of relationships in that society. Naturally, the different members of society 
have different views regarding what are appropriate societal relations. There are those 
who would like to see human rights as the focus of and the foundation of these 
relationships. Others see belief in God and the observing of his commandments as the 
necessary guide. There are those who would emphasize the good of the state as a whole, 
and there are those who concentrate on the good of the individual. It is necessary to reach 
a national compromise when choosing between values and principles. Indeed, the human 
beings are a complicated social being. Their life is complex. Their objectives are 
multidimensional. We want freedom of religion and freedom from religion; we wish to 
ensure both the common good and the individual good. But as attaining everything is 
impossible, we must choose and determine what our national priorities are. 
The methods of determining national priorities vary from one society to another. In 
a democratic system of government, the choice is made by the people, through their 
representatives. Behind this choice are the "rules of the game", in the center of which is 
the understanding that the people's representatives will seek out national compromise 
which will allow the individuals that make up society to live together. This national 
compromise is based on the recognition of basic human rights on the one hand, and the 
conservation of the existence of the state framework on the other. Democracy is not 
simply majority rule. 1 Democracy is majority rule intended to ensure human rights in the 
context of a living, breathing state. The state must not be sacrificed on the altar of human 
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rights. Human rights are not a prescription for national self-destruction.2 However, 
human rights must not be sacrificed on the altar of the state. The state exists for its 
individuals. Balance is needed between the common good and individual good, and 
between the good of each individual and that of his fellow individuals. Naturally, this 
balance varies from one society to another, and in the context of a given society, it varies 
from one time to another. It is influenced by the dangers that society faces, by its social 
structure, by its collective history, and by other factors which make up society's 
identity.3 
B. ON LAW 
The law, in a given democracy, at a given time, reflects the national balance that 
society has achieved. At that society's foundation stands the national decision to uphold 
a democratic form of government, whilst rejecting extreme alternatives. That decision is 
usually entrenched in a formal constitution which ensures that the character and form of 
government remain unchanged. The constitution determines certain priorities, to be 
preserved by future generations. From that standpoint, it can be said that the constitution 
it is not democratic, as it does not necessarily reflect the national priorities of the present 
members of society, but rather, the national compromise reached in the past. However, 
this lack of democracy is illusory for three reasons: first, the constitution sets forth ways 
for its amendment. Through the amendment process, society adapts the national priorities 
determined in the constitution to the national priorities understood to be appropriate in 
the present;4 second, the constitution preserves - as part of the essence of the 
government's form entrenched in the constitution - human rights. Opposite the 
majority's inability to change the national priorities (which impinges the democratic 
approach regarding majority rule) stand the recognized and protected human rights 
(which fulfill the democratic approach regarding human rights); 5 third, the constitution 
usually employs - particularly in the field of individual rights - "majestic 
generalities."6 These generalities, entrenched in fundamental rights (such as equality, 
human dignity, liberty, freedom of expression), constitute vague standards, which allow 
every given society, at a given time, to assign them the meaning that reflects the 
fundamental societal views of that period. Thus, a bridge is found between the past and 
the present's national compromise. 
2. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); EA 2/84 Neiman v. 
Chairman of the Cent. Elections Comm. 39(2) P.D. 225, 310 [1985] (Isr.), available at 
http://elyonI.court.gov. ii/files_ eng/84/020/000/ZO 1/84000020.zO1.pdf. 
3. See CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
(Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994). 
4. On the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, see Aharon Barak, Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV (forthcoming, 2012). 
5 See id. 
6. See Fayv. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947). 
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C. ON JUDGING 
I. Deciding Disputes 
Democracy is based upon a separation of powers. The meaning of this principle is 
twofold. 7 First, a demarcation between the various branches of government is 
recognized, whereas each governmental branch is assigned a role as its main and 
principal role; second, there is a reciprocal relationship between the various branches, 
such that each branch checks and balances the other branches, safeguarding the 
individual's rights. 8 In that context, the main and principal function of the legislative 
branch is the creation of general norms, whereas the principal function of the judicial 
branch is resolving disputes. While resolving a dispute, and as byproduct9 of that, the 
judicial branch must determine the law according to which the dispute is settled. The 
extent to which it determines the law while resolving the dispute varies from one legal 
system to another, and is derived from its tradition and culture. Every legal system 
recognizes the legitimacy of the judicial determination of law by way of the 
interpretation of the provisions of the constitution, statutes, contracts, or wills which 
apply to the dispute. 10 
In many cases, determining the law according to which the dispute is to be settled 
does not entail any judicial creativity whatsoever. The law before and after the dispute's 
resolution is the same law. In determining what that law is, the judge merely states the 
existing law. His actions are declarative and not creative. Only in the small minority of 
cases does the determination of the law involve judicial creativity. In these cases, the law 
prior to and after the dispute's resolution is not the same law. The judge does not merely 
declare what the existing law is; he creates new law. In such cases, the judge engages -
incidentally to deciding the case 11 - in judicial lawmaking. 12 Such lawmaking does not 
just create an individual legal norm (inter partes), whose only power is in the resolution 
of the dispute between the parties; it creates a general legal norm (ergo omnes), whether 
through the force of the principle of stare decisis, or other recognized technics that 
obligates not only the parties to the dispute, but all branches of the government and 
members of the public. 
2. Judicial Lawmaking 
What is the anatomy of judicial lawmaking? 13 It varies according to the kind of 
legal activity being carried out. The main judicial activity is the interpretation of a legal 
text (e.g., constitution, statute, regulation, contract, will), according to which the dispute 
7. See Barak, supra note I, at 35. 
8. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ('The purpose [of 
separation of powers] was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the 
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.''). 
9. See AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 174 ( 1989). 
I 0. See AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 40 (2005). 
11 See BARAK, supra note 9, at 173-7 4. 
12. Id. at 90. 
13. On judicial lawmaking, see id.; Mauro Cappelletti, The Law-Making Power of the Judge and Its Limits: 
A Comparative Analysis, 8 MONASH U. L. REV. 15 (1981). 
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is to be resolved. Interpretation is a rational activity giving legal meaning to a text. 14 
Interpretation, at times (but not always), involves judicial creativity. 15 The meaning of a 
text before the act of interpretation, and its meaning afterwards, are not one and the 
same. The reason for this can be found in the character of normative texts, which, just 
like any other text, is at times ambiguous and vague regarding a given set of factual 
circumstances. 16 This ambiguity and vagueness is usually clarified via the rules of 
interpretation, which succeed - without turning to judicial creativity - in extracting, 
from the various literal meanings of the normative text, a single legal meaning. However, 
the rules of interpretation do not always succeed in performing such extraction without 
any creativity whatsoever. At times, the success of the extraction - that is, the 
determination of a single legal meaning from the spectrum of literal meanings -
requires creative judicial activity. This creativity is necessary when the employment of 
the rules of interpretation do not bring forth one single meaning. In such a situation, the 
rules of interpretation require the interpreter to continue the process of interpretation -
while moving on from the declarative stage to the creative stage - as well to use 
interpretative discretion, with which the choice between the available possibilities is 
made, in a manner, that from the spectrum of literal meanings, one single legal meaning 
will be extracted. In such a situation, the rules of interpretation do not direct the 
interpreter in his choice, and that choice is subject to his discretion. 
3. Judicial Discretion 
Judicial discretion does not mean mere consideration and thought. Judicial 
discretion means choosing between two legitimate opinions. 17 As such, it is a normative 
process. In each legal system there are cases in which a judge faces a situation in which, 
on the one hand, the system requires him to interpret the legal text according to which 
the dispute will be decided, but on the other hand, the system does not force on him to 
choose a particular option from the spectrum of possibilities. These are "hard cases". 18 
How will a judge know that in a certain situation, there is judicial discretion? When will 
we determine that two or more options are legal, in such a manner that the choice 
between them requires judicial discretion? My answer is that the existence of judicial 
discretion is the result of the legal community's view in a given legal system. 19 The legal 
community is a normative concept that reflects the fundamental views, principles, rules 
of interpretation, and social consensus regarding the judicial activity in a given society at 
a given time.20 An option is legal ifit is viewed as such by the legal community. 
Judicial discretion is necessary. In my opinion, it is not possible to build a legal 
14. See BARAK, supra note 10, at 3. 
15. See id. at 207. 
16. See id. at 100. 
17. See BARAK, supra note 9, at 7 (stating "discretion is the power given to a person with authority to 
choose between two or more alternatives, when each of the alternatives is lawful"); see also MARISA IGLESIAS 
VILA, FACING JUDICIAL DISCRETION: LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND RIGHT ANSWERS REVISITED 8 (2001 ). 
18. On ''hard cases" see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSL y 81 ( 1977). 
19. See BARAK, supra note 9, at 9. 
20. See id.; Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). 
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interpretive system without judicial discretion.21 If a legal norm is embodied in a literal 
text, the interpretation process is necessary, and every interpretation process requires the 
recognition of judicial discretion. Judicial interpretation without judicial discretion is a 
myth. The ambiguous and vague nature of language (including the language and rules of 
interpretation), and the lack of consensus regarding the rules of interpretation, their 
sources and the internal relationships between them, require the recognition of 
interpretative discretion. Man's wisdom cannot create a general legal principle that can 
provide an unequivocal answer without the use of discretion, regarding the infinite 
amount of situations (some of which cannot be expected in advance) to which a principle 
may apply. 
Judicial discretion is never absolute.22 Even when the judge has the freedom to 
choose between one interpretation and another, he cannot choose between them however 
he pleases. He cannot toss a coin. He must employ his discretion within the boundaries 
set out by the law. He must act in the framework of the (substantive and procedural) 
considerations, considered to be legitimate by the law. Within the legal framework itself, 
he has discretion regarding the choice between the various options available. Indeed, 
judicial discretion - like any governmental discretion in a democratic state - is always 
limited. 
A judge must act objectively.23 He has no discretion to act in a way that is not 
objective. Judicial discretion exists only in the framework of the judge's objective 
activity. Judicial discretion exists only in the choice between the possibilities that have 
withstood the objective crucible. Again: the judge must act without favoritism or conflict 
of interest. But the objectivity requirement is even more comprehensive than that. A 
judge is objective when the choice of a given possibility, amongst a spectrum of possible 
options, is made because it is called for by a normative requirement, external to the 
judge. Such a requirement is necessitated, inter alia, by the fundamental attitudes of the 
society in which the judge lives. It is the fruit of the society's deep understanding 
regarding justice and the public's morals in the society in which he lives. When even this 
standard presents more than one possibility, the judge has no choice other than to choose 
what, subjectively, appears to him, as the best solution.24 This does not forfeit the need 
for objectivity. The judge has already gone through the objective stages. Only after he 
has done so, and found himself faced with a number of possibilities, must he act 
subjectively. He is left alone. 
According to my approach, not only does judicial discretion exist; the judge and 
the public should be aware of its existence. 25 For the judge, a reasonable decision is a 
conscious decision. An unconscious decision to employ judicial discretion does not carry 
with it the feeling of responsibility necessary for every judicial decision, and does not 
allow the judge to stand on guard regarding the need for judicial objectivity. The public, 
as well, should be aware of the fact that in the proper circumstances a judge has judicial 
21. See BARAK, supra note 10, at 207. 
22. See BARAK, supra note 9, at 19; see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 141 (1921); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924). 
23. See BARAK, supra note 1, at 102. 
24. See id. at 105. 
25 See BARAK, supra note 9, at 218. 
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discretion. Indeed, if judicial discretion means judicial lawmaking, the public is entitled 
to know who is creating its law and within what boundaries they are acting. The truth 
should not be hidden. The public confidence in the judicial branch would be damaged if 
the public becomes aware that judges say one thing, yet do another. The legitimacy of 
the judiciary can be maintained only if the public knows how to assess - and when 
necessary, criticize - the way its discretion is employed.26 Thus, judicial discretion 
should be discussed out in the open. It should not be swept under the rug. The judges 
themselves should express the judicial freedom granted to them and the considerations 
that led them to choose one option or another. 
4. On the Role of A Judge 
In exercising their discretion, the judge should aim to achieve two main objectives: 
The first is to bridge between law and life. 27 Thus when interpreting a constitution or a 
statute, the judge should give the text a dynamic meaning,28 one that strives to bridge the 
gap between law and life's changing reality without changing the text itself. In doing so, 
the judge must balance the need for change with the need for stability. Professor Roscoe 
Pound expressed this well more than eighty years ago; "Hence all thinking about law has 
struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability and of the need of 
change. Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still."29 
Stability without change is decline. Change without stability is anarchy. The role 
of a judge is to help bridge the gap between the needs of society and the law without 
allowing the legal system to decline or collapse into anarchy. 30 The judge must ensure 
stability with change, and change with stability. Like the eagle in the sky, maintaining 
stability only when moving, so too is the law stable only when moving. Achieving this 
goal is very difficult. The law's life is complex. It is not mere logic. It is not simply 
experience. It is both logic and experience together. The law's evolution throughout 
history must be cautious. The choice is not one between stability and change. It is a 
question of how fast the change occurs. The choice is not between rigidity and 
flexibility. It is a question of the degree of flexibility. 
The judge's second objective is to protect the constitution and democracy. 31 If we 
want to preserve democracy, we cannot take its existence for granted. We must fight for 
it. The assumption that "it won't happen to us" can no longer be accepted. Anything can 
happen. If democracy was disallowed and destroyed in the Germany of Kant, Beethoven, 
and Goethe, it can happen anywhere. Ifwe do not protect democracy, democracy will not 
protect us. I do not know whether the judges in Germany could have prevented Hitler 
from coming to power in the 1930s, but I do know that the lessons of the Holocaust and 
of the World War II era, helped promote the idea of judicial review of legislative 
26 See JULIUS STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 678 (1966). 
27. See BARAK, supra note 1, at 3. 
28. See BARAK, supra note 10, at 41; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
(1994). 
29. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 1946) (1923). 
3 0. See BARAK, supra note 1, at 11. 
31. See id. at 20. 
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action32 and made human rights crucial. These lessons led to the recognition of the 
defensive democracy33 and even the militant democracy.34 It shaped my belief that the 
main role of the judge in a democracy is to maintain and protect the constitution and 
democracy. As I noted in one of my opinions: 
The struggle for the law is never-ending. The need to watch over the rule of law 
exists at all times. Trees that we have nurtured for many years may be uprooted 
with one stroke of the axe. We must never loosen the protection of the rule of the 
law. All of us - all branches of government, all parties and factions, all 
institutions - must protect our young democracy. This protective role is 
conferred on the judiciary as a whole, and on the Supreme Court in particular. 
Once again, we, the judges of this generation, are charged with watching over our 
basic values and protecting them against those who challenge them. 35 
I believe that the protection of democracy is a priority for many judges in modern 
democracies. The judicial protection of democracy, in general, and of human rights in 
particular is a characteristic of most developing democracies. Legal scholars often 
explain this phenomenon as an increase in judicial power relative to other powers is 
society. This change, however, is merely a side effect. The purpose of this modern 
development is not to increase the power of the court in a democracy but rather to 
increase the protection of democracy and human rights. An increase in judicial power is 
an inevitable result, because judicial power is one of the many factors in the democratic 
balance. 
This second objective is tested when a democracy fights terror.36 Judges are, of 
course, tested daily in their protection of democracy, but judges meet their supreme test 
when they face situations of war and terrorism. The protection of human rights of every 
individual is a duty much more formidable in situations of war or terrorism than in times 
of peace and security. If judges fail in their role in times of war and terrorism, they will 
be unable to fulfill their role in times of peace and tranquility. It is a myth to think that it 
is possible to maintain a sharp distinction between the status of human rights during a 
period of war and the status of human rights during a period of peace. It is self-deception 
to believe that we can limit judicial rulings so that they will be valid only during 
wartime, and that we can decide that things will change in peacetime. The line between 
war and peace is thin; what one person calls peace, another calls war. In any case, it is 
impossible to maintain this distinction in the long term. Judges should assume that 
whatever they decide when terrorism is threatening security will linger many years after 
the terrorism is over. Indeed, judges must act with coherence and consistency. A wrong 
decision in a time of war and terrorism plots a point that will cause the judicial curve to 
32. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW TN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971); THE GLOBAL 
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjom Vallinder eds., 1997); GERHARD VAN DER SCHYFF, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE NETHERLANDS 
AND SOUTH AFRICA (2010). 
33. On defensive democracy, see BARAK, supra note 1, at 21, 30, 287. 
34. On militant democracy, see BARAK, id. See also MILITANT DEMOCRACY (Andras Sajo ed., 2004); THE 
'MILITANT DEMOCRACY' PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES (Markus Thiel ed., 2009). 
35. HCJ 5364/94 Veiner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party, 49(1) P.D. 758, 808 [1995] (lsr.). 
36. See Aharon Barak, Human Rights in Times of Terror-A Judicial Point of View, 28 LEGAL STUD. 493 
(2008). 
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deviate after the crisis passes.37 In one of my judgments I wrote: 
if we fail in our task in times of war and terror, we will not be able to carry out 
our task properly in times of peace and calm. From this viewpoint, a mistake by 
the judiciary in a time of emergency is more serious than a mistake of the 
legislature and the executive in a time of emergency. The reason for this is that the 
mistake of the judiciary will accompany democracy even when the threat of terror 
has passed, and it will remain in the case law of the court as a magnet for the 
development of new and problematic rulings. This is not the case with mistakes 
by the other powers. These will be cancelled and usually no-one will remember 
them.38 
Moreover, their democracy ensures judges independence. It strengthens the judges, 
because of their political non-accountability against the fluctuations of public opinion. 
The real test of this independence comes in situations of war and terrorism. The 
significance of the judge's non-accountability becomes clear in these situations when 
public opinion is more likely to be near-unanimous. Precisely in these times of war and 
terrorism, judges must embrace their supreme responsibility to protect democracy and 
the constitution. They should always reflect history - not hysteria. Admittedly, the 
struggle against terrorism turns our democracy into a 'defensive democracy' 39 or even a 
'militant democracy.' 40 Judges in the highest court of the modern democracy should act 
in the spirit of defensive fighting or militant democracy, as opposed to uncontrolled 
democracy. 
D. ON THE REALIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
1. The Legitimacy of the Means 
The means of realizing the judicial role must be legitimate; the principle of the 
rule of law applies first and foremost to judges themselves, who do not share the 
legislature's freedom in freely creating new tools. 41 The bricks with which we build our 
structures are limited. Our power to fulfill our role depends on our ability to design new 
structures with the same old bricks or to create in its limited discretion new bricks.42 
37. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson J., dissenting) ("[A] judicial 
construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty ... A 
military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency ... But once a 
judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the 
Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the 
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle 
then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need ... A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an 
incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it 
has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image."). See Patricia Hughes 
Judicial Independence: Contemporary Pressures and Appropriate Responses, 80 CANADIAN B. REV. 181, 186 
(2001) (noting the general agreement that 'judicial independence is both an individual and a systemic, 
institutional or 'collective' quality'). 
38. See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Leg. Ctr. For Arab Minority Rights in lsr. v. Minister of Interior, 61(2) P.O. 
202 [2006] (lsr.), available athttp://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/520/070/a47 /03070520.a47.pdf. 
39. See id. at 102, 123, 221. 
40. See id. at 102, 122. 
41. See BARAK, supra note 1, at 113. 
42. See M. Landau, Case-Law and Discretion in Doing Justice, l M!SHPATIM 292 (1965). 
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Sometimes there is great similarity between the new structures we build with the old 
bricks and the old structures we know from the past. We tend to say that there is nothing 
new under the sun, and that the legal pendulum swings to and fro before returning to its 
point of origin. But these analogies are inappropriate. The structures are always new. 
There is no return to the point of origin; the movement is always forward. Law is in 
constant motion; the question is merely regarding the rate of progress, its direction, and 
the forces propelling it. Moreover, sometimes we succeed in creating new "tools." Here 
law's genius is evident. But such inventions are few and far between. Usually we come 
back to the old tools and use them to resolve these new situations. The most important 
tool is interpretation. 
2. On Interpretation 
The supreme and constitutional courts' main activity is interpretation. This is true 
of both civil law and in common law legal systems. The key question is what is the 
proper system of interpretation? Neither common law43 nor civil law44 systems have a 
satisfying answer to that question.45 It seems to me that the solution lies in the answer to 
another question: What is the aim of interpretation? My answer is that interpretation's 
aim is to realize the law's purpose.46 Hence, my theory of interpretation is the purposive 
theory of interpretation.47 In constitutional law it means, that the purpose of the 
constitutional text is its subjective-historical purpose and its objective-modern purpose. 
How should the constitution be interpreted when the subjective purpose conflicts with 
the objective purpose? The answer to that question lies in the unique character of the 
constitution.48 A constitution enshrines a special kind of norm and is found at the top of 
the normative pyramid. Difficult to amend, it is designed to direct human behavior for 
years to come. It shapes the state's appearance and its aspirations throughout history. 49 
It determines the state's fundamental political views. It lays the foundation for its social 
values. It determines its commitments and orientations. It reflects the events of the past. 
It lays the foundation for the present. It determines how the future will look. It is 
philosophy, politics, society, and law all in one. 
How does a constitution's unique character affect its interpretation? In determining 
the purpose of a constitution, how does its distinctive nature affect the relationship 
between its subjective and objective elements? My answer is this: 50 one should take both 
the subjective and objective elements into account when determining the purpose of the 
43. HENRY MELVIN HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS TN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
44. See Konrad Zweigert & Hans Jurgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpertation - Civilan Style, 44 TUL. L. 
REV. 704, 714 ( 1970). 
45. See GTDON GOTTLIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF RULE AND 
RATIONALITY 91 (1968). On comparison between common law systems of interpretation and civil law systems 
of interpretation, see INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil MacCormick & Robert S. 
Summers eds., 1991 ). 
46. See BARAK, supra note 10, at 219. 
4 7. Id. 
48. Jd.at371. 
49. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2 (1985). 
50. See BARAK, supra note 10, at 375-84. 
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constitution. The framers' original intent at the time of drafting and the original 
understanding of that time is important. One cannot understand the present without 
understanding the past. The original understanding lends historical depth to 
understanding the text in a way that honors the past. The original understanding, 
however, exists alongside the fundamental views and values of modern society at the 
time of interpretation. The constitution is intended to solve the problems of the 
contemporary person, to protect his freedom. It must contend with his needs. Therefore, 
in determining the constitution's purpose through interpretation, one must also take into 
account the values and principles that prevail at the time of interpretation, seeking 
synthesis and harmony between past understanding and present principles. 
We return, then to the original question: What is the proper relationship between 
the subjective and objective elements in determining the purpose of the constitution 
when the subjective and the objective pull in different directions? In my opinion, greater 
weight should be accorded to the objective purposes. 51 Only by preferring the objective 
elements can the constitution fulfill its purpose. Only in this way is it possible to guide 
human behavior through generations of social change. Only in this way is it possible to 
balance the past, present and future. Only in this way can the constitution provide 
answers to modern needs. Admittedly, the past influences the present, but it does not 
determine it. The past guides the presents, but it does not enslave it. Fundamental social 
views, derived from the past and woven into social and legal history, find their modern 
expression in the old constitutional text. Justice Brennan expressed this idea well in the 
following remarks: 
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way we can: as Twentieth 
Century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the 
intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do 
the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not 
in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current 
needs. What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times 
cannot be their measure to the vision of our time. The vision of their time. 
Similarity, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn, 
cannot be their measure to the vision of their time. 52 
The same idea was advanced by the Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of 
Australia, who said that "[O]ur Constitution belongs to the 21st century, and not the 
l 9th.,,53 
Various courts have issued opinions in the same spirit, 54 including the Canadian 
Supreme Court55 the Australian High Court,56 the Israeli Supreme Court57 and the 
51. See BARAK, supra note 10, at 384-93. 
52. Brennan, supra note 49, at 7. 
53. Michael Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship.?, 24 
MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000). 
54. See generally INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ed.) 
(2006) [hereinafter INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS]. 
55. See PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (5th ed. 2007). 
56. See Haig Patapan, The Dead Hand of the Founders.? Original Intent and the Constitutional Protection 
of Rights and Freedoms in Australia, 25 FED. L. REV. 211 (1007); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to 
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German Constitutional Court. 58 This is the purposive interpretation that I espouse. It 
does not ignore the subjective purpose in constitutional interpretation, but it does not 
give it controlling precedence either. The weight of the subjective purpose decreases as 
the constitution ages and becomes more difficult to change. In interpreting such 
constitutions, the preferred objective purpose reflects deeply held modern views in the 
legal system's movement through history. The constitution thus becomes a living norm 
and not a fossil, preventing the enslavement of the present to the past. 
In these legal systems - Canada, Australia, Israel and Germany - neither the 
original understanding, nor the intent of the framers, occupies a central role in judicial 
consideration of constitutional interpretation. 59 Of course, neither is it ignored; but they 
remain far from being the discussion's focal point. 
This approach was not adopted in the United States.60 There is hardly a consensus 
regarding the proper weight to be accorded to past interpretations. Instead, in the United 
States, the competing notions of original intent of the founding fathers (also known as 
"intentionalism"), the original understanding of the terms used in the Constitution 
("originalism"), and the "living constitution"61 are all sources of an ongoing debate in 
academic writing and on the bench.62 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court itself is 
- and has been for years - divided on this issue. 63 The entire corpus of American 
Legalism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 54, at 144. 
57. See BARAK, supra note I 0. 
58. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 42 (2nd ed., 1977). 
59. See Claire L'Heureux-Oube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization, The Rehnquist Court and 
Human Rights, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 234 (M. H. Belskey ed., 2002). 
60. See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS, 45-82 
(2011 ). 
61. See discussion infra, Part D. 
62. The literature on the issue is vast. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMER IC AN CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 4 7-70 
(3rd ed., 2000); see also; William Kaplin, The Process of Constitutional Interpretation: A Synthesis of the 
Present and a Guide to the Future, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 983 (1990); Michael Perry, The Legitimacy of 
Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669 (1991); CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (S. J. Brison & W.Sinnot-Armstrong eds., 1993); R. 
Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional 
Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121 (1994); WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); CHARLES SAMPFORD & KIM PRESTON, INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS 
(1996); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1999); DENNIS GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER 0RTGINALISM 
(2005); INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006); JOHNATHAN O'NEIL, ORIGINALISM 
IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2007); SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. 
FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (2007); 0RIGINALISM: A QUARTER-
CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007); Jamal Greene, On the Origins ofOriginalism, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. l (2009); KENT GREENAWALT LEGAL INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND 
PRIVATE TEXTS (2010); Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: 
ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Grant Huscroft & Bradley Miller eds., 2011). 
63. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting). See also 
M. C. Dor( Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation. 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1998); Cf Justice 
Brennan's position, supra note 49, with Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUSTICE UNDER OLD CONSTITUTIONS 313, 315 (Eivind Smith ed., 1995) ("I do not worry about my old 
Constitution ·obstructing modernity,' since I take that to be its whole purpose. The very objective of a basic 
law, it seems to me, is to place certain matters beyond risk of change, except through the extraordinary 
democratic majorities that constitutional amendment requires .... The whole purpose of a constitution - old or 
new - is to impede change, or, pejoratively put, to 'abstract modernity.'''). 
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constitutional law finds itself in a state of crisis due to this lack of consensus. Without 
accord in the legal community about the proper role that original intent, original 
understanding, and current notions of constitutional interpretation should play in 
determining the meaning of constitutional provisions today, the entire constitutional 
system is hanging in the balance.64 A crisis of this sort has been avoided in Canada, 
Australia, Germany and Israel. Hopefully other constitutional legal systems will 
successfully avoid this dangerous situation, which may tear apart the legal system as well 
as focus all legal energy on the crisis. 
According to the purposive constitutional interpretation approach, the intent of the 
framers or the original understanding should not be ignored; however, they should not be 
of higher status. 65 It is the objective - rather than the subjective - purpose that should 
be accorded most of the interpretative weight. The objective purpose properly reflects the 
basic modem notions of the legal system as it moves across history. This is how a 
constitution turns into a living document rather than remains stagnant parchment. This is 
how the present is not subjugated by the past. Indeed, constitutional interpretation is the 
process in which every generation expresses its own basic concepts as they were shaped 
against the nation's historical background.66 This process is not limitless; it is not open-
ended. The interpreter, providing meaning to the constitutional text, must work within a 
given social and historical framework. And although the judge is sometimes accorded 
judicial discretion by the system, this discretion is bounded by a limited set of values, 
traditions, history, and text that are unique to the system in which he operates. Indeed, 
the process of eliciting a constitutional purpose is based on fundamental concepts that 
seek to create a strong link to the constitutional past and grant it its due weight. The 
interpreter does not disconnect from the system's constitutional history. And while the 
ultimate modern constitutional purpose is objective, its roots lie far in the constitutional 
past. "The constitutional provision was not legislated in a constitutional vacuum and 
does not develop in a constitutional incubator. Rather, it is a part of life."67 
By stressing the importance of the objective purpose of the constitution the rules of 
interpretation as used by judges enable the judiciary to fulfill its role: to bridge the gap 
between law and society and to protect the constitution and democracy. 
64. That includes the approach that the founding fathers themselves wanted the Constitution to be 
interpreted according to its objective purpose. See, e.g., Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Robert Clinton, Original Understanding. Legal Realism. and 
the Interpretation of "This Constitution", 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987); Charles Lofgren, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent? 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the 
Intention of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989); Hans Baade, 
'Original Intent' in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Suzanna 
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1994); William Michael, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent: A Textual Analysis, 26 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 201 (2000). 
65. For criticism on my approach, see Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon 
Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109 (2008). Regarding intentionalism, see 
Larry Alexander, Of Living Trees and Dead Hands: The Interpretation of Constitutions and 
Constitutional Rights, 22 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 227 (2009). 
66. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1068 (1981). 
67. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 49(4) P.O. 221, 235 [1995] 
(Isr.) (Barak, P.). 
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3. On Balancing 
"Balancing" is a very important tool in fulfilling the judicial role. 68 There are three 
main reasons for that: First, it expresses the complexity of the human being and the 
complexity of human relations. Law is not everything or nothing. Law is a complex 
system of principles that in certain situations are in harmony with each other and lead to 
a single conclusion, whereas in other situations, they clash with each other, making 
adjudication necessary. The balancing technique expresses this complexity. It nicely 
reflects my eclectic philosophy that takes the entirety of values into consideration and 
seeks to balance them according to life's changing needs. 69 The approach is based on the 
broader view that law is based on principles; that these principles are not always in 
harmony, that principles sometimes conflict, that every legal system establishes the 
proper balances between the different principles, that those balances constitute the 
infrastructure of every legal system. Indeed, the entirety of public law is balance of 
clashing principles. This is the case of the internal conflicts between the various 
components of formal democracy. This is the case of the internal conflicts within 
substantive democracy. Indeed, constitutional, administrative, and criminal law are the 
product of these conflicts. Similarly, the entirety of private law is a balance between 
various human rights. For example, tort law is a balance between the individual's 
freedom of activity vis-a-vis the state and the constitutional rights of others vis-a-vis the 
state and the public interest. Second, balancing is particularly well-suited for realizing 
the judicial role. Bridging law and life and protecting the constitution and its values can 
best be attained through the technique of balancing, which takes modern constitutional 
principles into consideration.70 This balancing, if conducted properly, bridges the gap 
between the old law and life's new reality, protecting the constitution and its principles. 
Third, balancing introduces order into legal thought. It requires the judge to identify the 
relevant principles; it requires the judge to address the problem of the relative social 
importance; it requires judges to reveal their way of thinking to themselves, as well as to 
others. It facilitates self-criticism and criticism from the outside. 71 
Balancing is a normative process by which one attempts to resolve a conflict 
between conflicting principles. 72 The solution is not one of "all or nothing." The loosing 
principle is not removed from the law. The decision is made by assigning weight to the 
conflicting principles, and preferring the prevailing one. In balancing, the various 
principles preserve their place in the legal system. One cannot balance without a scale, 
and one cannot use a scale unless the relative weight of the various principles is 
determined. One example of this is the conflict between the principle of public peace and 
the freedom of speech. The system of balancing assigns each of the conflicting principles 
weight and determines when it is permissible to limit those principles (freedom of 
speech) in order to further another principle (public peace). 
The process of balancing is based on the identification of principles relevant to 
68 On balancing in constitutional law, see BARAK, supra note 60, 340-70. 
69. See discussion infra, Part D. 
70. See supra Part C.IV. 
71. See BARAK, supra note 60, 457-80. 
72. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 100 (2002). 
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resolving the question before the judge. Each of these principles is given a certain 
weight, and placed on the scale. The result of the weighing determines the answer to the 
question. There is of course, no physical scale. Physical weights and balances are not to 
be found. The principles do not appear before the judge with a label displaying their 
weight. The process is not physical but normative. The talk of"balancing", and "weight" 
is metaphorical speech.73 Such speech cannot provide a solution to the conflict between 
the principles. It can only present it in a descriptive way. Indeed, like other metaphorical 
expressions, such as the reasonable person, the metaphors do not grant normative content 
to the ideas brought across by them. Nor do they grant logical basis to the ideas. They 
merely present them in an understandable way. 
How can one balance between public peace and freedom of speech? Isn't it like 
balancing between five kilos and four meters? 74 The answer is that balancing requires a 
common denominator. That denominator is the social importance of the conflicting 
principles at the point of conflict. 75 One has to balance between the social importance of 
more public peace and the social importance of less free speech. Please note that the 
comparison is not between the advantages gained by public peace generally and the 
disadvantage of limiting free speech generally. The comparison is between the marginal 
benefit to public peace and the marginal harm to free speech. The comparison is 
concerned with the marginal and the in incremental. 76 
In determining the social marginal importance the judge has to look at the legal 
system as a whole. He has to consider the constitution and the role the different 
principles play in it. He has to read the legal systems history and the jurisprudents of the 
courts. The judge attempts to express the basic values of the society in which he lives. 
The applicability of balancing is very broad. We balance the formal and 
substantive aspects of democracy; we balance the fundamental of democracy against 
human rights, we balance the various fundamental principles; we balance the conflict 
between different kind of human rights. We also use balancing in context of purposive 
interpretation. 77 
One of the most important situations where balancing is used is the case where a 
statute limits constitutional rights. Thus, a statute may limit the constitutional right of 
freedom expression in order to advance the public peace or another constitutional right, 
like privacy or reputation. The constitutionality of the statute will be decided by the rules 
of proportionality. 78 One of the most important components of proportionality is 
balancing (or proportionality stricto sensu).79 
How is this balancing conducted? What are the rules of balancing?80 The basic 
73. See BARAK, supra note I, at 168. 
74. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises Inc, 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (''[T]he scale 
analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging 
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."). 
75. See BARAK, supra note 60, 481-92; BARAK, supra note 1, at 168. 
76. See STEVEN HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 70 (2008); Deiter Grimm, Proportionality 
in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L. J. 383, 396 (2007). 
77. On interpretive balancing, see BARAK, supra note 60, 45-82. 
78. See BARAK, supra note 60. 
79. See id. at 340-70. 
80. See ALEXY, supra note 72, at 100. 
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rule of balancing can be expressed as follows: To the extent that greater importance is 
attached to preventing the marginal limit to a constitutional right and to the extent that 
the probability of the right being limited is higher, the marginal benefit to the public 
interest brought about by the limitation must be of greater importance, of greater 
urgency, and possessing a greater probability of materializing. 81 Following this rule 
there is always a concrete balancing - ad hoc balancing - which reflects the specific 
circumstances of the case. 
In my view there is place to create an intermediate level between the basic 
balancing and the concrete balancing. This should be a principled balance that translates 
the basic balancing rule into a number of principled balancing rules formulated at the 
lower level of abstraction than the basic balancing rule and at a higher level than that of a 
concrete balancing. This level would express the principles at the basis of the right and 
the justification for its limitation.82 Here is an example: Assume that the goal of the 
limitation is protection of public peace in face of hate speech. The principled balancing 
rule might determine that it is only permissible to limit freedom of political speech when 
the goal of protecting public peace from the consequences of hate speech is crucially 
important for the realization of an urgent social need that is required to prevent extensive 
and immediate harm to public peace. The principled balancing rule is thus characterized 
by a level of abstraction that gives expression to the reasons underlying the right and the 
justifications for its limitation. 
Is it proper for the judge to be involved in balancing? It is not the function of the 
political brunches? In my view the final word on balancing between constitution rights 
and their sub-constitutional limitations should be of the judges. 83 In a case dealing with 
the constitution of the separation fence in the west bank I wrote: 
The military commander is the expert regarding the military quality of the 
separation fence route. We are experts regarding its humanitarian aspects. The 
military commander determines where, on hill and plain, the separation fence will 
be erected. This is his expertise. We examine whether this route's harm to the 
local residents is proportionate. This is our expertise. 84 
It is my view that in a democracy, the judiciary - the unelected independent 
judiciary - should be entrusted to be the final decision-maker - subject to 
constitutional amendments85 - about proper ends that cannot be achieved because they 
are not proportional stricto sensu.86 There are certain limits of proportionality stricto 
sensu that the political branches are forbidden to cross. A case in example is Adalah v. 
The Minister of Interior, in which the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that a statute that 
prohibits family unification between Israeli Arab citizens and their non-Israeli spouses 
from the West Bank because of the security risk associated with non-Israeli spouses, 
which caused in the past more than twenty terrorist attacks, is unconstitutional since it is 
81. See BARAK, supra note 60, 340-70; See also id. 
82. See BARAK, supra note 60, 528-46; BARAK, supra note 1, at 171. 
83. See BARAK, supra note 60, 379-418. 
84. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, 58 P.D. 807, 845 [2004] (lsr.). 
85. Those amendments should be constitutional: see supra Part B. 
86. See BARAK, supra note 60, 379-418. 
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it disproportionally limits the right to dignity. In my judgment I wrote: 
Examination of the test of proportionality (in the narrow sense) returns us to first 
principles that are the foundation of our constitutional democracy and the human 
rights that are enjoyed by Israelis. These principles are that the end do not justify 
the means; the security is not above all else; that the proper purpose of increasing 
security does not justify serious harm to the lives of many thousands of Israeli 
citizens. Our democracy is characterized by the fact that it imposes limits on the 
ability to limit human rights; that it is based on the recognition that surrounding 
the individual there is a wall protecting his rights, which cannot be breached even 
by the majority. 87 
Many may disagree with me on balancing and the role of the court in balancing. To 
these critics, my only answer is: I am aware of your criticism, but I have not found a 
better system. It is my view that if we take human rights seriously we should accept 
balancing and judicial discretion in balancing. 
4. On Justifiability 
The Law is everywhere. Thus, every problem is 'justiciable" in the sense that, 
there is a legal norm that takes a stance towards it. That is "normative" (or material) 
justiciability.88 According to this approach - which does not recognize a lack of 
normative justiciability - there is no limit to the law's reach. Everywhere there are 
people, there is law. There are no areas of life that are external to the law. There are no 
acts (actions or omissions) that the law does not apply to. Every act is caught in the law's 
net. Even the most political of activities - such as making peace or war - are examined 
by legal standards. The international and municipal law takes a stand regarding its 
legality. Indeed, an issue's nature as "political" - that is, the fact that its resolution 
involves political implications - does not negate the fact that it is under the law's 
control. Everything is subject to the law's control in the sense that the law takes a stance 
on the question of whether it is legal or not. Of course, the political character of the 
activity is likely, at times, to formulate a legal norm which grants, pursuant to its content, 
wide discretion to the political branch to act as it wishes. However, this freedom is not 
freedom from law, but rather freedom within the law. 89 
The other type of justifiability is "institutional" justifiability. 90 Institutional 
justifiability is intended to answer the question whether it is appropriate for the court, as 
a state organ, to decide certain types of disputes. Those who claim a lack of institutional 
justifiability believe that there are certain disputes inappropriate for the court to decide. 
These disputes, although not outside the law - should be settled outside the court. An 
example of such a case is a dispute regarding the legality of making peace or war. The 
argument is that the court is not an appropriate institution for such decisions; that it is 
appropriate that a political decision be made by the political organs. The argument is that 
involving the court in these decisions violates the principle of separation of powers, the 
87. See supra note 38, at 109. 
88. See BARAK, supra note I, at 178. 
89. See id. at 177. 
90. See id. at 183. 
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democratic form of government, and damages the court's status. These arguments 
assume - and the assumption is correct - that handing the decision in these disputes 
over to the political organs means that the decision may be made not according to legal 
standards. All are aware that by replacing the deciding organ we may also replace the 
standards according to which the decision will be made. The argument therefore is that it 
is not appropriate for the decision in such matters to be made by the court and according 
to the law. 
Prima facie, this is a very problematic argument. The assumption is that the court 
has the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. From where does the court draw the power to 
refuse to adjudicate this type of disputes? Is it not a basic rule of law and adjudication 
that the court must decide the disputes brought before it, and that it is not permitted to 
tum away the parties to a dispute within its jurisdiction? Is this not an expression of 
political thinking - inappropriate for a judge - to refrain from adjudication in light of 
the political nature of the dispute? Moreover, the argument that the court is not an 
appropriate institution to resolve political disputes is based on the incorrect assumption 
that the court will settle the dispute through political standards. Indeed, if the court's 
decision is "political" - that is, not made according to legal standards - it is 
appropriate that the decision be made by the political organs. In this context, the 
argument that a court's "political" decision in a political dispute violates the separation 
of power and democracy and harms the court's status is correct. But what fault exists 
when the court decides a political dispute according to legal standards? What fault is 
there in taking a legal stand on a question whether political activity is legal - as 
opposed to the determination that it is appropriate or inappropriate from the political 
point of view? Should it not be said that the principle of separation of powers justifies 
judicial review - on the basis of legal standards - of all state acts, including those that 
are of a political nature par excellence? How, from the standpoint of separation of 
powers, can refraining from making a legal decision on the basis of legal standards be 
justified? Is there no truth in the argument that the real meaning of the judicial branch's 
removing its hand from the decision of a political dispute - by legal standards -
constitutes the recognition of the political branches' power to decide political disputes 
illegally? By that, not only is the rule of law violated, but also the principle of separation 
of powers - which is intended to ensure balancing and checking between the various 
branches - is breached. Should it not be said that the appropriate relief for those 
wishing to ensure flexibility of action for the political branches is not in locking the gates 
of the court and therefore in the implicit consent to violation of the law, but rather in 
making a substantive amendment to the law which grants the political branches greater 
freedom to act? And regarding those unwilling to take such an extreme step must they 
not ultimately consent to judicial review performed according to legal standards? What 
harm is there to the status of the court when it decides a political dispute according to 
legal standards? Is there no foundation to the argument that it is actually the removing of 
the court's hand from the political dispute that will lead to an undermining of public 
confidence in adjudication?91 
91. See id. at 186. 
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5. On Standing 
The issue of standing appears to be marginal in public law. I disagree. 92 The rules 
of standing are central in the performance of the judicial role. They are a vital tool in 
bridging the gap between law and society, and in protecting the constitution and 
democracy. Tell me what your views on standing are and I will tell you what your views 
on judging are. I wrote in one of my judgments thirty years ago: 
You cannot formulate the rules of standing if you do not formulate for yourself an 
outlook on the role of these rules in public law. In order to formulate an outlook 
about the nature and role of the rules of standing, you must adopt a position on the 
role of judicial review in the field of public law .... [I]n order to formulate an 
outlook regarding the role of judicial review, you must adopt a position on the 
judicial role in society and the status of the judiciary among the other branches of 
the state. A judge whose judicial philosophy is based merely on the view that the 
role of the judge is to settle a dispute between persons with existing rights is very 
different from a judge whose judicial philosophy is enshrined in the recognition 
that his role is to create rights and enforce the rule oflaw. 93 
Thus, my position is that anyone should have legal standing to question the legality 
of any state action. Locking the gates of the court before a petitioner without any special 
interest who is arguing against an illegal state action harms the enforcement of the law. 
Where there is no rule by judge, there is no rule of law. Law is replaced by power. The 
ability to access the court is the cornerstone of democracy. A public agency is a fiduciary 
that acts for the sake of the individual. In the areas of public law, each individual has the 
right that state actions remain within the framework of the law. The constitution of South 
Africa makes it clear by providing that: 
"Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair." 94 
The South African Constitution goes on to state that "anyone acting in the public 
interest has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill 
Rights has been infringed or threatened"95 
Behind my views about standing is the recognition that every individual has an 
interest in a government that acts according to the law, and that such an interest is 
protected by the law. Indeed, the laws of standing turn the individual's interest in a 
government that acts according to the law into the right of the individual that the 
government act legally. This is the importance of the laws of standing. They are not 
simply a procedural means to regulate the flow of the court's docket. They are a central 
tool for ensuring the bridging of law and life and protecting the constitution and 
democracy. 
92. See id. at 190. 
93. HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 42(2) P.O. 441, 458 [1988] (Isr.). 
94. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 33(1). 
95. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 38(d). 
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6. Comparative Law 
I have found comparative law to be of great assistance in realizing my role as a 
judge.96 The case law of the courts of the United States, Australia, Canada, the United 
Kingdom and Germany have helped me significantly in finding the right path to follow. 
Indeed, comparing oneself to others allows for greater self-awareness. With comparative 
law, the judge expands the horizon and the interpretive landscape. Comparative law 
enriches the options available to us. In different legal systems, similar legal institutions 
often fulfill corresponding roles, and similar legal problems (such as hate speech, 
privacy, and now the fight against terrorism) arise. To the extent that these similarities 
exist, comparative law becomes an important tool with which judges fulfill their role in 
democracy ("microcomparison").97 Moreover, because many of the basic principles of 
democracy are common to democratic countries, there is good reason to compare them 
("macrocomparison") as well. 98 Indeed, different democratic legal systems often 
encounter similar problems. Examining a foreign solution may help a judge choose the 
best local solution. This usefulness applies both to the development of the common law 
and to the interpretation of legal texts. 
Naturally, one must approach comparative law cautiously, remaining cognizant of 
its limitations. Comparative law is not merely the comparison of laws. A useful 
comparison can exist only if the legal systems have a common ideological foundation. 
The judge must be sensitive to the uniqueness of each legal system. Nonetheless, when 
the judge is convinced that the relative social, historical, and religious circumstances 
create a common ideological basis, it is possible to refer to a foreign legal system for a 
source of comparison and inspiration. Indeed, the importance of comparative law lies in 
extending the judge's horizons. Comparative law awakens judges to the latent potential 
of their own legal systems. It informs judges about the successes and failures that may 
result from adopting a particular legal solution. It refers judges to the relationship 
between a solution to the legal problem before them and other legal problems. Thus, 
comparative law acts as an experienced friend. Of course, there is no obligation to refer 
to comparative law. Thus the South African Constitution provides that when courts 
interpret the bill of right they "must consider international law and may consider foreign 
law."99 Additionally, even when comparative law is consulted, the final decision must 
always be local. The benefit of comparative law is an expanding judicial thinking about 
the possible arguments, legal trends, and decision-making structures available. 
This measured approach towards the use of comparative constitutional law is not 
shared by all; in particular, the issue has created a deep rift within the American legal 
96. See BARAK, supra note 1, at 197; BARAK, supra note 60, 45-82; Aharon Barak, Constitutional 
Interpretation, in L'INTERPRETATION CONSTITUTIONNELLE (2005). See also; Sir Basil Markensinis & Jorg 
Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11 (2005); Aharon Barak, Response to the Judge as 
Comparatist: Comparison in Public Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 195 (2005); Laurie W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional 
Comparativism in South Africa: A Response to Sir Basil Markensinis & Jorg Fedtke, 80 TUL. L. REV. 169 
(2005); Laurie W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa, 123 S. AFRICAN L. J. 497 
(2006). 
97. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 
3rd ed. 1998). 
98. Id. at 4. 
99. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 39(l)(b)- (c). 
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system. 1 oo There, the "originalist" camp - supporting the notion that the original 
understanding should govern the interpretation of the constitutional text - strenuously 
opposes the idea of considering any comparative or foreign law not part of such 
understanding. Despite that, the pattern in American law seems to have moved in the 
direction of more openness towards foreign and comparative law. 101 It is hoped the 
Court will proceed in this direction. 102 
E. ON LEGAL AND JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 
While working as a judge, I have found that a good philosophy is a very practical 
tool in solving hard cases in which the judge has discretion. A philosophy of life and a 
philosophy of law assists the judge in understanding life and law. As to philosophy of 
law, I found myself having an eclectic approach. 103 It contains components from each of 
the main theoretical doctrines. In my opinion, the relationship between members of 
society, and between society and its members, is complicated and complex to the extent 
that it cannot be described by one single point of view. Human experience is too rich to 
be limited to one theory. In my opinion, the naturalists, the positivists, the realists and the 
neo-realists, the members of the historical - economic or sociological schools - all 
reflect, from different angles, the amassed human experience. Each of them has truth in 
it. One can "theoretically" agree with each of them, but there arises a need to balance 
between the various views. According to my approach, the solution is not found in one 
single independent theory. One must take certain components from each of the main 
theories, while determining a proper balance between them. None of the theories can 
remain pure. Balancing is always needed. It may be that this eclectic philosophy is a 
philosophy in and of itself. Whatever the case may be, in my opinion, the law, as a 
normative system, has a role in society. It is intended to ensure functional social life. It 
contains order and security alongside justice and morals. My pluralistic approach teaches 
me that there is no consensus regarding the relative weight of these values, and that 
different people have different opinions on the subject. The democratic form of 
government determines which institutions and organs are assigned the role of 
determining such relative weight. 
Most importantly for a judge, however, is to articulate to themselves their judicial 
philosophy. 104 By judicial philosophy I mean a system of nonobligatory considerations 
that will guide the judge in exercising his discretion. These are a set of thoughts about 
how to exercise discretion in hard cases. Judicial philosophy is an organized thought 
about the way in which a judge is to contend with the complexities of a hard case. In my 
experience, the majority of judges have such a judicial philosophy. For most, it is an 
I 00. See BARAK, supra note 60, 45-82. 
I 01. See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & lddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign law Debate in Heller: The Proportionality 
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2011 ON SOCIETY, LAW, AND JUDGING 317 
unconscious philosophy. I strive to raise judicial philosophy into the realm of 
consciousness and subject it to public critique. 
The judge's judicial philosophy is closely intertwined with their personal 
experience. It is influenced by their education and personality. Some judges are more 
cautious and others are less so. There are judges that are more readily influenced by a 
certain kind of claim than others. Some judges require a heavy "burden of proof' in 
order to depart from existing law, while others require a lighter "burden of proof' in 
order to do so. Every judge has a complex life experience that influences his approach to 
life, and therefore influences his approach to law. There are judges for whom 
considerations of national security or individual freedoms are weightier than for other 
judges. There are judges whose personal makeup obligates order, and as a result, they 
require an organic development and evolution of the law. There are judges whose 
personalities place great importance on the proper solution, even if they reach that 
solution in a non-evolutionary fashion. There are judges whose starting point is judicial 
activism; there are judges whose starting point is self-restraint. There are judges who 
give special weight to considerations of justice in the general sphere, even if it creates 
injustice in the individual case. Other judges emphasize justice in the individual case 
even ifit does not fit in with the general justice found at the basis of the norm. 
One must always remember that judicial philosophy is relevant only in the realm in 
which the judge has judicial discretion. It functions only within a zone of reasonableness. 
It works only in those cases where the legal problem has more than one legal solution. It 
is relevant only in the hard cases, in which the judge strives to achieve the optimal 
solution. Judicial philosophy aims to bring us to this safe space. It is the main compass 
that directs the judge (consciously or unconsciously) in discovering the solution to the 
hard cases with which he is confronted. Professor Freund wrote that "the most important 
thing about a judge is his philosophy; and if it be dangerous for him to have one, it is at 
all events less dangerous than the self-deception of having none." 105 
F. FINAL REMARKS 
I regarded myself as a judge who was sensitive to his role in a democracy. I took 
seriously the tasks imposed upon me; to bridge the gap between law and society and to 
protect the constitution and democracy. Despite frequent criticism - and it frequently 
descends to the level of personal attacks and threats of violence - I have continued on 
this path for twenty eight years. I hope that by doing so, I was serving my legal system 
properly. Indeed, judges in highest courts must continue on their paths according to their 
consciences. Judges are guided by their North Star: the fundamental values and 
principles of constitutional democracy. They bear a heavy responsibility on their 
shoulders. But even in hard times, they must remain true to themselves. I discussed this 
duty in an opinion considering whether torture may be used on a terrorist in "ticking 
bomb" situations. My answer - and the answer of the court - was no. In my judgment 
I wrote: 
Deciding these applications has been difficult for us. True, from the legal 
105. Paul Freund, Social Justice and the Law, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 93, 110 (Richard Brandt ed., 1962). 
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perspective, the road before us is smooth. We are, however, part oflsraeli society. 
We know its problems and we live its history. We are aware of the harsh reality of 
terrorism in which we are, at times, immersed. The fear that our ruling will 
prevent us from properly dealing with terrorists troubles us. But we are judges. 
We demand that others act according to law. This too, is the demand we make of 
our-selves. When we sit at trial, we stand on trial. 106 
106. HCJ 5100/94. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel, 43(4) P.D 817, 845 [1999] (Isr.). 
